We provide a general impossibility theorem on the aggregation of preferences under uncertainty. We axiomatize in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences, called rank-dependent additive preferences that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty as well as state-dependent versions of these models. We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if and only if (society's) preferences are uncertainty neutral. The latter means that society cannot have a non-neutral attitude toward uncertainty on a subclass of acts. A corollary to our theorem is that it is not possible to aggregate multiple prior agents, even when they all have the same set of priors. A number of extensions are considered.
1 Introduction Harsanyi (1955) celebrated result shows that it is possible to aggregate von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility maximizers: the social utility is a convex combination of the agents' utilities. Extending this result to more general settings turns out to be difficult. For instance, whenever agents are expected utility maximizers but entertain different beliefs, aggregation becomes impossible.
In this paper, we take up this issue, widening considerably the set of preferences considered, that encompasses many well-known models of decision under uncertainty (subjective expected utility, multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , Choquet expected utility of Schmeidler (1989) and more generally c-linear biseparable preferences of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) , as well as state-dependent versions of these preferences). 1 We show a general impossibility result of the following form. Assume agents and society have preferences in this domain. 2 Then, aggregating (some) agents' preferences is possible if and only if they possess a form of uncertainty neutrality, to be discussed momentarily, and leads to linear aggregation. In particular, if an agent has some kind of non neutral attitude towards uncertainty, then either he is a dictator (society's preferences place a zero weight on all other agents) or he gets a zero weight in the society's preferences. A particular case of interest is when agents conform to the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , in which an agent evaluates an act by taking its minimal expected utility with respect to a set of priors. Then, a corollary of our result is that aggregation of such agents is impossible unless they are actually expected utility agents (in which case the set of priors is a singleton.)
The result complements several previous results in the literature. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , Seidenfeld, Kadane, and Schervish (1989) , and Mongin (1995) showed that aggregation of subjective expected utility agents was not possible as soon as they have different beliefs. Mongin (1998) showed that expanding the class of preferences to state-dependent preferences would yield a possibility result but argued against this way of restoring the possibility of aggregating preferences. He showed in particular that as soon as one pins down the beliefs of the agents then state-dependence is of no help. Chambers and Hayashi (2006) showed that eventwise monotonicity (P3) and weak comparative probability (P4) are incompatible with the Pareto axiom. Relaxing these axioms while keeping the sure-thing principle leads to state-dependent expected utility preferences, for which they show a possibility result in a Savage setting. Our setting allows for state-dependence preferences from the beginning and our impossibility theorem applies to state-dependent preferences as well. Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004) showed in a subjective expected utility setting, that imposing the Pareto axiom on issues for which agents are unanimous (have identical beliefs) implies that the society's beliefs have to be an affine combination of agents' beliefs and, similarly, that the society's vNM utility function has to be a linear combination of agents' vNM utility functions (note that this does not imply that society's overall utility function is a convex combination of the agents'.) A corollary to our main result is that in the multiple prior model, aggregation is impossible even in the case when all agents have the same set of priors. Thus, restricting the Pareto axiom has no bite here. Finally, Blackorby, Donaldson, and Mongin (2004) showed, in a somewhat different framework (that of ex ante-ex post aggregation), that aggregation was essentially impossible in the rank dependent expected utility model.
As we mentioned, we want to allow for state dependence while at the same time allowing for all kinds of attitudes toward uncertainty. There is no decision model in the literature that achieves this goal. A first contribution of the present paper is hence to develop a fairly general model of preferences under uncertainty, allowing for state-dependence. Then, assuming agents conform to this decision model, we show that it is impossible to aggregate agents' preferences into a well-defined preference relation at the social level that would also conform to this model unless agents have uncertainty neutral preferences, where uncertainty-neutrality is defined in the spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) as indifference to mixing indifferent acts.
As argued in Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004) , the relevance of this literature is partly due to the rhetoric of decision making in a democracy. Quoting these authors, "(...) the theoretical conclusion that aggregating tastes and beliefs is impossible, is troubling. If there is, indeed, no way to aggregate preferences of all individuals, then a ruling party or a president may feel exempted from seeking to represent society in its entirety even if elected by an incidental majority. (...) However, we argue that the impossibility results cannot be cited as an indirect justification of ignoring minority views, because they rely on a counterintuitive assumption. By contrast, a more intuitive version of this assumption necessitates aggregation of preferences." Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004) ,p.935.
The counterintuitive assumption they refer to is the Pareto axiom that says that if all individuals in society agree on preferences between two alternatives, so should society. As we mentioned, they replace it by a weaker Pareto condition that applies only when all individuals have identical beliefs or, dually, when they have identical tastes. A consequence of our result is to show that their possibility result hinges on the fact that all individuals are Bayesian expected utility maximizers. If, however, some of these individuals do not conform to expected utility, for instance because they do not have precise (subjective) probabilities, but rather a range of probabilities, their result no longer holds. Indeed, the present paper shows that a wide variety of models, allowing for some type of Knightian uncertainty, give rise to impossibility result even if the Pareto condition is restricted to identical "beliefs". In this sense, we are back to the troubling theoretical conclusion that a ruling party or president might be entitled to act in a dictatorial way, since there is no reasonable way to aggregate preferences when individuals differ both in utilities and in beliefs.
The paper is divided into six sections and three appendices. Section 2 introduces the decision theoretic setup needed, while Section 3 contains a new representation result. The main result of the paper, the impossibility result, is in Section 4. Section 5 provides extensions and a discussion. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains three models illustrating the decision theoretic part developed in Sections 2 and 3. Appendix B contains the proof of the representation result given in Section 3, while Appendix C contains the proof of the aggregation result.
Setup
We consider a society made of a finite number of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Let N = {0, 1, . . . , n} where 0 refers to society. Uncertainty is represented by a set S and an algebra of events Σ. We adopt Anscombe and Aumann (1963) 's framework: Let X be a non-empty set of consequences and Y be the set of distributions over X with finite support. Let A be the set of acts, that is, functions f : S → Y which are measurable with respect to Σ. Since Y is a mixture space, one can define for any f, g ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1], the act αf
We model the preferences of an agent i ∈ N on A by a binary relation i , and, as customary we denote by ∼ i and i its symmetric and asymmetric components. Society's preferences are denoted 0 . The first axiom is usual, will be maintained throughout, and states that preferences are a complete, transitive, and continuous relation. It is enough to show that there exists a representation of on A.
if f g and g h then f h;
We will almost exclusively be interested in the properties of preferences on a small domain of acts on which they have some structure. We next define the notion of regular acts from which this domain will be constructed, as the relevant domain will consist of binary acts whose components are regular. 3
For an event E and two acts f and g, denote f E g the act giving f (s) if s ∈ E and g(s) if not. For F ⊂ A and E ∈ Σ, let B(F, E) = {f E g |f, g ∈ F } that is, binary acts on the event E whose components belong to a subset of acts F. When there is no possible confusion about the reference set F, we will simply call such acts binary acts.
Definition 1 Let E ∈ Σ. A set of acts R ⊂ A is E -regular with respect to if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. R is a mixture set: For all f, g ∈ R and α ∈ (0, 1), αf
Weak sure-thing principle for R-binary acts: For all acts
Note that for any event E the whole set A is E-regular for subjective expected utility (both state-independent and state-dependent). 4 Condition 1 requires that the set of E-regular acts be closed under the mixture operation. Condition 2 is in the spirit of C-independence of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) with the difference that it applies only to R-binary acts. It means that E-regular acts cannot be used to hedge against R-binary acts. Condition 2 also entails that the independence axiom holds when restricted to acts in R. Thus, preferences on E-regular acts are uncertainty neutral on the event E 5 and will be of the vNM type. Condition 3 is a weak version of the sure-thing principle, again restricted to R-binary acts. Note that this weak property is not violated in Ellsberg kind of experiments. In the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , this condition is satisfied, being a consequence of monotonicity. 6 3 Rank-dependent additive preferences
Representation result
As explained above, we will be concerned only with the properties of the preference relation on the domain of R-binary acts. We thus define a notion of representation, which is affine with respect to E-regular acts.
for all f ∈ B(R, E), h ∈ R, and α
We now characterize preferences that admit an E-regular set of acts for some event E, generalizing results known for the class of c-linear biseparable preferences. This representation will be key to establish under which conditions aggregation is possible. Furthermore, for any R-affine representation V of ,
there exist four linear functions
Preferences that satisfy the requirements of Proposition 1 will be called rank-dependent additive (with respect to R) in the following. Existence of an R-affine representation is straightforward and well-known (it follows from vNM like arguments). The first property establishes that the evaluation of binary acts f E g with f, g ∈ R can be decomposed in a rank-dependent additive manner, the decomposition being dependent on the ranking of the two acts. The second property can be seen as a way to identify the agent's attitude toward uncertainty attached to an event, which we will define and characterize in the following section.
Most models of decision under uncertainty cast in the Anscombe-Aumann framework are rank-dependent additive. Rank-dependent additive preferences can accommodate state-dependence. This is why, contrary to c-linear biseparable preferences, "beliefs" do not appear explicitly in the functional. Indeed, were we to make them explicit, we would get back to the usual problem that, when allowing for state-dependence, beliefs cannot be uniquely pinned down. We will discuss this in more details in Section 5.
3.2 Uncertainty neutral rank-dependent additive preferences Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) defined uncertainty aversion as a preference for mixing: for any acts f, g, f ∼ g ⇒ αf + (1 − α)g f . We will here limit the domain of application to a smaller set of acts. Furthermore, we define a notion of uncertainty neutrality rather than uncertainty aversion, as the important distinction for us will be between agents that are neutral toward uncertainty and agents that have a non neutral attitude toward uncertainty (uncertainty averse or seeking). Based on the intuition underlying this definition we propose the following definition of uncertainty neutrality on an event with respect to a set of acts. 7
Definition 3 Let E ∈ Σ and D ⊂ A. Say that is uncertainty neutral on E with respect to
Obviously, a preference relation that satisfies the independence axiom over the whole set of acts will be uncertainty neutral on any event. The next claim proves that rank-additive preferences with k E = 0 are uncertainty neutral on E.
Proposition 2 Under the representation of Proposition 1, is uncertainty neutral on event E with respect to R if and only if k E = 0.
In the following, we argue that in the class of preferences considered, uncertainty neutrality is the crucial property that delimits the frontier between the possibility and impossibility of linear aggregation.
Betting attitudes
Although it is difficult to define "beliefs" in our model, in particular because it allows for statedependence, we can define a notion of betting preference and more precisely, give meaning to the idea that two rank-dependent additive decision makers have the same betting preference on an event E.
Definition 4 Let E ∈ Σ and let i and j be preferences satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 1. Say that i and j have the same betting preferences on E if there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1), f, g ∈ R i , f , g ∈ R j such that f i g and f j g and
In this definition, we use mixing to calibrate the betting behavior of the decision makers on event E, as is customary in an Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setting. Condition (i) says that both agents evaluate f E g as if they were placing a weight α on E. The next two conditions would be irrelevant in a state-independent setting. However, in our setting, it is possible for instance that f i g but f E g i f . The other three conditions use the same calibrating technique to assess the agents' betting behavior on E c . The weight β could be greater or smaller than 1 − α.
The next proposition shows that the notion of identical betting preferences is captured, in the representation of Proposition 1, by the fact that the two agents have the same coefficient k E .
Proposition 3 Let E ∈ Σ and let i and j be preferences satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 1. If i and j have the same betting preferences on E then
This characterization will be useful when we discuss the extension of our main theorem to situations in which agents have identical betting attitudes, in relation to Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004) argument.
4 Aggregation of rank-dependent additive preferences: an impossibility result
For the aggregation problem to be interesting, one needs to impose some diversity among the preferences that one seeks to aggregate. The next definition provides one such condition (see Mongin (1998) 
On the other hand, it seems natural to impose for the society's preference to comply with any unanimous agreement among individuals: If everybody agree that some alternative f is strictly better than some other alternative g, so should society. This requirement is formally stated in the following Pareto Axiom.
We can now state our main theorem. 
In words the theorem says that, under the assumptions that individuals and society's preferences are "well behaved" on a subset of acts -and notably satisfy the independence axiom on this subset-, either society's preferences are a linear aggregation of uncertainty neutral individuals' preferences or there is a dictator. It cannot be the case that society's preferences are the result of the aggregation of an uncertainty averse agent with any other type (uncertainty averse, loving or neutral) of agent. A consequence is that if society's preferences display a non neutral attitude toward uncertainty (of the limited kind corresponding to the fact that it is not uncertainty neutral on some event with respect to R 0 ), then it must be dictatorial. Remark that the theorem is in a sense stronger than Harsanyi's since uncertainty neutrality of the preferences is a consequence and not an assumption of the theorem. 8 While we will discuss in the next section variations around this theorem, it is important to notice here that it applies even if we restrict all agents to have the same betting preferences on E. It is enough to observe that nothing in the assumptions of the theorem prevents the fact that all agents have the same coefficient k E . Thus, we have the following corollary. Thus, what's driving the impossibility result is not heterogeneity in betting attitudes. To make this point clear in models where a notion of beliefs have been defined, consider the class of c-linear biseparable preferences and let A c denote the set of constant acts. If for all i ∈ N , i are c-linear biseparable and not uncertainty neutral on E, and the Independent Prospects Property holds on A c , then Axiom 2 holds if and only if there exists j ∈ N such that 0 = j . This is a direct consequence of the fact that A c is regular for c-linear biseparable preferences and as we establish in the Appendix, that these preferences are not uncertainty neutral with respect to that set.
Two important particular cases covered are when agents and society have multiple prior preferences and when they have Choquet expected utility preferences of Schmeidler (1989) . Hence, for instance, it is not possible to aggregate multiple prior preferences into a multiple prior social preferences, irrespective of the fact that the sets of priors are identical among agents. Whereas in an expected utility setting it is possible to aggregate agents with the same beliefs, this does not generalize to non-expected utility settings.
The proof of the theorem is divided into two distinct parts. The first one is a direct application of Proposition 2 in De Meyer and Mongin (1995) . It states that, given the underlying convex structure (recall we are in an Anscombe-Aumann setting), the Pareto axiom implies that V 0 is a weighted sum of the V i s. Hence, aggregation has to be linear. The second part can itself be divided in two.
First, the Independent Prospects Property on ∩ i∈N R i states that for any i, there exist h , h in ∩ i∈N R i such that h i h and h ∼ j h , ∀j ∈ N \ {i}. Using these acts for any i, one can establish that for any agent i that has a non zero weight
Thus, all agents that are taken into account in V 0 must have the same attitude toward uncertainty.
Second, we prove that k E 0 = 0 as soon as there are two agents with non zero weights. Assume for simplicity that only agent 1 and 2 have non zero weight. The argument relies on the fact that, using the Independent Prospects Property and mixing acts, one can find two acts f, g ∈ ∩ i∈N R i such that f 1 g and f ≺ 2 g, while f ∼ 0 g. The uncertainty neutrality of the preferences can then be established by computing
The first one is direct and establishes that this quantity is zero since f ∼ 0 g. The second one is to compute it decomposing V 0 as the sum of λ 1 V 1 and λ 2 V 2 . Using the fact that
Discussion and extensions
In this section we review known arguments to restore possibility in the expected utility setting and show how they adapt or not to our setting. We also study the strength of various assumptions made in the impossibility result. Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2004) taking stock of the existing impossibility results under expected utility whenever agents have different beliefs Mongin (1995) suggested to weaken the Pareto principle to acts on which the agents have the same beliefs. 9 They established then that it is possible to aggregate linearly and separately tastes and beliefs. Such a way to restore possibility would not work in our context. As we argued, even if agents have the same betting attitudes (which, under expected utility amounts to same beliefs), aggregation is impossible under uncertainty non neutrality. In the multiple prior model for instance one can identify, for the sake of the argument, "beliefs" with the set of priors. Then, as we have shown, aggregation is not possible even when agents all have the same "beliefs". Thus weakening the Pareto principle to acts on which agents have the same betting attitudes does not appear to be a solution here.
Weakening the Pareto axiom

State dependence
As shown by Mongin (1998) and Chambers and Hayashi (2006) (in a Savage setting) a way to circumvent the impossibility of aggregating subjective expected utility agents when they have different beliefs is to enrich the possible domain for society's preferences. Specifically, they allowed for state-dependence in society's preferences (while remaining in the subjective utility class). Since state-dependent preferences are already included in our class of preferences, our result embeds their possibility result. However, it also shows that such a way of restoring the possibility of aggregation will not work when preferences are not uncertainty neutral. Thus, the arguments existing in the literature do not work in our setting. We now explore what type of result is achievable relaxing the independent prospects property, binary independence and the weak sure-thing principle.
Diversity condition
Embedded in the assumptions of the Theorem is the fact that social preferences has a rich set of regular acts. Conditions 2 and 3 indeed entail that there exists a set on which binary R-independence holds for all preferences and such that, on this set, the Independent Prospects Property hold. One might wonder what would happen, were one to relax this assumption. Imagine for instance that all agents have multiple prior preferences with the same risk preferences (their vNM utility function u is the same), but different sets of priors,
) is a multiple prior preference for society that satisfies the Pareto axiom. Thus, in this case, linear aggregation is indeed possible, echoing the possibility results in the subjective expected utility case with different priors but same vNM utility function (Mongin (1995) ).
More generally, consider c-linear biseparable preferences and assume that all agents have the same vNM utility function u. Then, as recalled in Appendix A, for any f, g ∈ A c ,
Then, it is straightforward to see that defining V 0 on A c by V 0 = i λ i V i for some positive vector (λ 1 , . . . , λ N ) yields a c-linear biseparable preference for society that satisfies the Pareto axiom. These weights ρ 0 (E) and ρ 0 (E c ) are given, respectively, by
Hence, to the extent that agents have the same risk preferences (the same vNM utility) but differ in their (non probabilistic) beliefs, then aggregation is possible.
Independence
Binary R-Independence obviously plays a crucial role in the proof of the impossibility result. Interestingly, the result still holds when instead of imposing binary R-independence on the social preferences, one requires only that independence be satisfied by the social preferences on regular acts. On the other hand, if one is willing to abandon any form of independence for social preferences, then some form of aggregation is possible. It will not be a linear aggregation since a linear combination of functionals that satisfy independence would also satisfy independence. To illustrate, take the multiple prior model and assume that agents all have their set of priors equal to the simplex, so that
is a perfectly legitimate preference for the society, that respects the Pareto axiom. If one defines u 0 by u 0 (f (s)) = min i u i (f (s)) then V 0 (f ) is then simply equal to min s u 0 (f (s)). Although this functional looks like a multiple prior functional, one should notice that, unlike what happens in the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model, C-independence is not satisfied and hence u 0 is not linear. Hence, society's preference on regular acts is not of the vNM type, while we adopted throughout the idea that, restricted to these acts, Harsnayi's theorem applies. For instance, when the set of regular acts is the set of constant acts, we assume agents and society to be vNM on these acts as it is the case in Harsanyi's setting. What the impossibility result shows is that it is impossible to maintain this assumption while assuming non neutral attitude toward uncertainty outside of the domain of regular acts.
Dropping the weak sure-thing principle
The next result shows that linear aggregation is possible if one is willing to drop the weak sure-thing principle at the society's level. In other words, defining V 0 as i λ i V i is an aggregation procedure that satisfies the Pareto axiom. Furthermore, V 0 hence defined satisfies the independence axiom with respect to mixing with acts in ∩ i∈N R i . However, it violates the weak sure-thing principle. 
Then, Axiom 2 holds if and only if, there exists an
This way of aggregating preferences has the same pros and cons as those identified in the discussion of Harsanyi's theorem (see Weymark (1991) and Mongin (2002) for instance). In particular, if one wants to use this theorem as an operational means to identify society's preferences, then one is forced to adopt some extra assumptions bearing on inter-personal welfare comparisons (via cardinalization of the preferences for instance).
What are the consequences of abandoning the weak sure-thing principle for binary acts for the society? When it is relaxed, it is not possible to define conditional preferences any longer. Thus, it is not possible to construct ex ante preferences from a notion of conditional preferences. At best, an incomplete notion of conditional preferences (f E 0 g if and only if f E h 0 g E h for all h ∈ R) can be defined.
The important consequence of this technical remark is that dominance reasoning is hence not possible at the society's level. In the multiple prior example, even if one obtains a vNM utility function u 0 for the society, it is not possible to conclude that an act that yields higher utility to another act state by state is preferred to that latter act. If one considers that dominance is a property that individuals' preferences should satisfy, then linear aggregation is here possible at the cost of assuming that the society's preferences do not satisfy the same "rationality" criteria as individuals.
Impossibility with smooth preferences: an example
In this section, we provide an example in which the class of preferences considered is of the "smooth ambiguity averse" typeà la Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and in which aggregation fails to be possible. Consider two agents, 1 and 2, and denote society as above by 0.
for i = 0, 1, 2, where p i is a unique subjective probability distribution, U i is a vNM utility function on A c and ϕ i is the second level utility function which captures attitude toward ambiguity. Assume ϕ i , i = 1, 2 is strictly concave, reflecting ambiguity aversion. Assume furthermore that the Independent Prospects Property holds on A c . Since Harsanyi's condition are satisfied on these acts, it has to be the case that U 0 = α 1 U 1 + α 2 U 2 , for some α 1 , α 2 ∈ R + . Assume without loss of generality that α 1 ≥ α 2 . Let E be an event and assume for the sake of simplicity that p 1 (E) = p 2 (E) = 1/2.
From the Independent Prospects Property, there exist three constant acts x, y, and z such that 1 prefers x to y and 2 prefers y to x, while z is indifferent to y for 1 and to x for 2.
Construct now the three constant acts h, k, and as follows:
These three acts are constructed so that society is indifferent among them, while 1 and 2 have opposite preferences on them, namely k 1 1 h and h 2 2 k Indeed, direct computation yields the following table:
Since society is indifferent among these three constant acts, it cannot exhibit any uncertainty attitude with respect to, for instance, the binary act of the kind h E k. In particular, h E k is indifferent from the society view point to . Hence, it will fail to capture the uncertainty non neutrality of agents 1 and 2. We now make this more precise.
Observe 
) . Given that ϕ 1 is assumed to be strictly concave, one has
In a similar fashion, it is easy to establish that
We then get the contradiction to the Pareto axiom we were after, namely
Observe that the argument in the example follows closely the one of the proof of Theorem 1 (see the intuition given page 10). Note also that we do not need to specify the distortion function ϕ i and hence that this example shows that aggregation fails even when agents have the same attitude toward ambiguity.
This example, which is not pathological, shows that it is not possible to prove an aggregation result concerning ambiguity averse agentsà la Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) . As we show in Appendix A, these preferences fail to satisfy A c -independence, but do satisfy the weak sure-thing principle, while they obviously satisfy the independence axiom on A c (being of the vNM type on this domain). This, we conjecture, might be enough to show a more general impossibility result, namely that if preferences satisfy the independence axiom on {R i } i∈N and the weak sure-thing principle for {R i } i∈N -binary acts, then the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds, that is, it is not possible to aggregate uncertainty non neutral agents. This however would require to have a more general decision theoretic model in which binary independence does not hold. Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) is one such model but a rather specific one and a general characterization remains to be done.
Concluding remarks
We have explored in detail the (im)possibility of aggregating preferences under uncertainty and have established that under rather weak requirements, expected utility over the entire domain is actually a necessary condition to obtain a possibility result. For decision makers who have expected utility over lotteries, there is no scope for any non neutral attitude toward uncertainty if one wants to be able to construct a social preference. Thus, for instance, the notion of a representative multiple prior agent does not make much sense (even in the particular case in which all agents have the same set of priors). This general impossibility result shows that extending Harsanyi's aggregation procedure to deal with uncertainty is not possible unless one is in the special case in which individuals and society are expected utility. Essentially, any deviation from expected utility that would incorporate a non-neutral attitude toward uncertainty prevents aggregation.
This general negative result also enabled us to identify the conditions that are at the heart of the impossibility results. Dropping a monotonicity requirement (the weak sure-thing principle on binary acts) at the society's level restores the possibility of aggregationà la Harsanyi. As we argued in the previous section, this comes at a cost since a consequence of dropping this requirement is that society's conditional preferences are not well-defined, in the sense that they do not form a complete order, and therefore dominance arguments become irrelevant. However, one could proceed with this incompleteness, and also assume that society's ex ante preferences be incomplete. We leave this exploration for further research.
Appendix A: Examples
In this Appendix, we provide three illustrations of our decision theoretic constructs.
A1. c-linear biseparable preferences
For any subset F of A, let B(F) = {f E g |f, g ∈ F and E ∈ Σ }.
is c-linear biseparable if it can be represented by a function V : A → R, such that:
where ρ is a capacity;
Claim 1 A c is E-regular for c-linear biseparable preferences for any event E.
Proof. Let E ∈ Σ be an event. That such preferences satisfy binary A c -independence is a direct implication of the fact that V (αf
Let's now check that these preferences satisfy the weak sure-thing principle for A c -binary acts as well. Let f, g, h, h be constant acts. Assume for instance that f h and h g, (other cases can be dealt with in a similar manner). Note that this implies that f g. Assume finally that f E h g E h. This implies:
We now check that f E h g E h for any h ∈ A c . Three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : f h and g h . In this case,
which is the case by assumption.
Case 2 : f h and h g. In this case,
which is the case since u(f ) ≥ u(h ) ≥ u(g).
Case 3 : h f and h g.
In this case,
Claim 2 c-linear bi-separable preferences are rank-dependent additive with respect to A c for any event E.
Defining k E = ρ(E) + ρ(E c ) − 1 yields the desired result (property 2 in the proposition).
Claim 3 c-linear bi-separable preferences fail in general to be uncertainty neutral on an event E with respect to A c .
Proof. Let f, g, h, ∈ A c be such that f g and
h. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and assume w.l.o.g.
Therefore, these preferences are uncertainty neutral on an event E with respect to A c if, and only if ρ(E) = 1 − ρ(E c ), which does not hold in general.
A2. State dependent α-MMEU
is a state-dependent α−MMEU preference if it can be represented by
where u s is an affine function on Y for all s ∈ S.
Claim 4 Let E ∈ Σ. The set A cv = {f ∈ A s.th. ∀s, t u s (f (s)) = u t (f (t))} of constant utility acts is E-regular for state-dependent α−MMEU preferences.
Proof. Notice first that A cv is a mixture set. Second, it is also easy to establish that V (αf + (1 − α)g) = αV (f ) + (1 − α)V (g) for all f ∈ B(A cv , E) and g ∈ A cv . Third, we check that condition 3 of Definition 1 holds as well. Remark that for all f, h ∈ A cv , one has:
where p(E) = min p∈C p(E) and p(E) = min p∈C p(E). Now, for all f, g, h ∈ A cv , it is straightforward, using the expression obtained for V (f E h) and looking at all the possible ranking of
, thus establishing that property 2 holds.
Claim 5 State-dependent α-MMEU are rank-dependent additive for event E with respect to A cv
Proof. Recall that
where
p(E) = min p∈C p(E) and p(E) = min p∈C p(E).
To conclude that state-dependent α-MMEU are rank-dependent additive with respect to A cv , it is enough to identify the functions V E , V E c , V E , and V E c by looking at the expression obtained for V (f E h).
Claim 6 Let E ∈ Σ. State-dependent α−MMEU fail in general to be uncertainty neutral for E with respect to the set of constant utility acts
Proof. Let f, g, h, ∈ A c be such that f g and h. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and assume wlog (λf + (1 − λ)h) (λg + (1 − λ) ). Letp(E) (resp. p(E)) be the upper (resp. lower) probability of E in C. Then,
Therefore, V is uncertainty neutral on E with respect to A cv only ifp(E) = p(E), which does not hold in general.
A3. Smooth ambiguity aversion
is smoothly ambiguity averse on B(A c , E) if it can be represented by:
on B (A c , E) , where p is a unique subjective probability distribution, U is a vNM utility function on A c and ϕ is the second level utility function which captures attitude toward ambiguity.
Claim 7 Smooth ambiguity averse preferences violate binary A c independence.
Proof. Note that for all f, g, h ∈ A c and λ ∈ (0, 1):
In other words, this functional is not linear with respect to probabilistic combination between A c -binary acts and constant acts.
Claim 8 Smooth ambiguity averse preferences satisfy the weak sure-thing principle and independence on
Independence holds given that preferences on constant acts are vNM.
Observe that smooth ambiguity averse preferences are not rank-dependent additive.
Claim 9 Let E ∈ Σ. Smooth ambiguity averse preferences in general not uncertainty neutral on E with respect to the set of constant acts.
Proof. Since smooth ambiguity averse preferences reduce to expected utility on constant acts, they are uncertainty neutral with respect to A c . Now, let f, g, h, ∈ A c and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
On the other hand,
Therefore, these preferences are uncertainty neutral with respect to A c only if ϕ is linear, i.e., when these preferences satisfy the reduction of compound lottery axiom, in which case they are ambiguity neutral according to Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) .
Appendix B B1. Proof of Proposition 1
Existence of an R-affine representation follows from a usual vNM kind of proof and is omitted here. Next, for sake of simplicity we prove the properties 1 & 2 at the same time. Let V be any R-affine representation of .
For any event E and acts f, g ∈ R, say that f E g if for all act h ∈ R, f E h g E h. This relation is well-defined since satisfies the weak sure-thing principle for binary acts. Denote E and ≈ E strict preference and indifference respectively. It can be checked that by definition of R, E satisfies the vNM axioms.
The proof is decomposed in two depending on whether there exist f , f ∈ R such that
As a first step, we show that either E = E c or E c is a reverse order of E , in the sense that f E c g if and only if g E f , for all f, g ∈ R. In step 2, we complete the proof of properties 1 and 2. 
Since f ∈ R,
But we also have by definition of R,
and a > a c . In the case where a ≤ a c , then either a < a c or a = a c but in this last event, b < b c and the proof can be easily adapted in both cases. Hence, E = E c .
Case (b) : f E f and f E c f . In this case, we show that E c is a reverse order of E , that is, for all f, g ∈ R, f E g if and only if g E c f .
Observe first that it has to be the case that
Suppose E c is not a reverse order of E , that is, there exist f, g ∈ R , such that f E g while f E c g. As in case (a), we can assume w.
Either a > a c , or a < a c , or a = a c and b < b c . In the case a > a c , we can replicate the argument for case (a) to show that (a − a c ) (
The proof can be adapted to the other cases to show a similar contradiction.
Step2. Properties 1 and 2 hold when there exist
Given that is not degenerate on R, there exist f , f ∈ R such that f f . Thus, define for any f
Let us prove that for all f, g ∈ R,
Consider f, g ∈ R such that f g and consider the case where
In the case where
In the other cases, the proof can be easily adapted to show that
If f g,
Without loss of generality, suppose that f f , f E f and f E c f . Consider V E , V E the vNM utility functions representing E and V E c , V E c the vNM utility functions representing E c such that
Note that it is possible to choose this normalization for these vNM utility functions since f E f and f E c f and thus
Let f, g ∈ R such that f g. Consider a first case where
Since E c is a reverse order of E , we also have that
Consider a second case where f E f and f E g. Then, there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1) such that
We also have
and thus
The proof can be adapted in the cases where
Then we also have f ≈ E c af + (1 − a)f and f ≈ E c bg + (1 − b)f , and thus, f ∼ af + (1 − a)f and f ∼ bg + (1 − b)f , which yields a contradiction to the fact that f g. We can prove that a similar contradiction occurs if we assume f E f and g E f .
Since V E , V E are vNM representations of E , V E c , V E c are vNM representations of E c and since they are two reverse orders, the uniqueness conditions imply that
Let's now check that the representation satisfies property 2.
Case 2.
g) which proves that properties 1 and 2 hold.
Suppose now that there
In either case, consider V E and V E c the vNM utility functions representing E and E c such that
Note that it is possible to choose this normalization for these vNM utility functions. Indeed, in case (a), we have f E f and f E c f and the normalization proposed is such that
Let f, g ∈ R and consider a first case where f E f E f and g is in between f and f according to E c . Then there exist a, b c ∈ (0, 1) such that
Consider now a second case, where f E f and g is in between f and f according to E c . Then there exist a, b c ∈ (0, 1) such that
Therefore by definition of R,
We also have that
Thus
In the other cases the proof can be adapted to show that
Finally, remark that property 2 is satisfied with k E = 0.
B2. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose is uncertainty neutral on E with respect to R. Let us prove that for all f, g ∈ R,
Let f, g ∈ R and assume first that f ∼ g.
If
and is uncertainty neutral on E,
Thus we have that
which is equivalent to
and finally to
The proof is similar for the other cases (f h or f E g and f E c g). Suppose now that f g and consider a first case where f E g and f E c g and thus
. Since is uncertainty neutral on E,
The proof is similar in the case where
Conversely, suppose that k E = 0. Consider the utility functions V E , V E , V E c and V E c . As shown in the proof of Proposition 1 these functions are linear with respect to mixture on R.
and thus (αf
B3. Proof of Proposition 3
Observe first that, since i and j satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 1, they have a representation as in that proposition. Hence, for f and g such that
Consider first the combination of case (i) and (i'), i.e.,
Then, using the representation, (i) implies that
Consider next case (i) and (ii'). Then,
The other cases can be dealt with in a similar fashion.
Appendix C C1. Proof of Theorem 1
In this Appendix, we provide the proof of our main result. We decompose the proof into 4 lemmas. Although not always explicitly stated in the lemma, all the assumptions of Theorem 1 are made throughout this Appendix. The following Lemma is adapted from Weymark (1993, Lemma 1): Lemma 1 Let (V i ) i∈N be a collection of R i -affine representation of i for all i ∈ N and assume conditions 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Then, (V 1 , · · · , V n ) are affinely independent on ∩ i∈N R i .
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that (V
with at least one λ j = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that λ 1 = −1. We then have:
Let f and g in ∩ i∈N R i be such that f ∼ i g for all i = 1 and f 1 g (such acts exist, since { i } i∈N satisfy the independent prospects property on ∩ i R i ). But equation (2) implies that
Proof. For all i ∈ N , letf i , f i ∈ ∩ i∈N R i be such thatf i i f i andf i ∼ j f i for all j = i (such acts exist since { i } i∈N satisfy the independent prospects property). Consider α j ∈ ]0, 1[ for j = 2, .., n and define recursivelyf j , f j by
Since ∩ i∈N R i is a mixture space,f n , f n ∈ ∩ i∈N R i and it can be checked thatf n i f n for all i ∈ N .
Lemma 3 Let E ∈ Σ. Let (V i ) i∈N be a collection of R i -affine representation of i for all i ∈ N and assume conditions 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 1 are satisfied. There exist unique weights (λ 1 , · · · , λ n ) ∈ R n + \ {0}, µ ∈ R, such that
Proof. Define F : B(∩ i∈N R i , E) → R n+1 by F (f ) = (V 0 (f ), V 1 (f ), · · · , V n (f )) and let K f = co{f, ∩ i∈N R i } for all f ∈ B(∩ i∈N R i , E). Clearly, for all f ∈ B(∩ i∈N R i , E), K f is a convex set, ∩ i∈N R i ⊆ K f , and f ∈B(∩ i∈N R i ,E) K f = B(∩ i∈N R i , E).
We first prove that F (K f ) is convex for all f ∈ B(∩ i∈N R i , E). Let f be fixed, and consider g 1 , g 2 ∈ K f , with g 1 = g 2 . Let γ = tF (g 1 )+(1−t)F (g 2 ), with t ∈ (0, 1). By definition, there exist α 1 , α 2 ∈ [0, 1], and h 1 , h 2 ∈ ∩ i∈N R i such that g 1 = α 1 f + (1 − α 1 )h 1 and g 2 = α 2 f + (1 − α 2 )h 2 . Let g 3 = tg 1 + (1 − t)g 2 . Let V i (h 1 )
Hence F (g 3 ) = γ, which proves that F (K f ) is convex. By Proposition 2 in De Meyer and Mongin (1995) , the convexity of F (K f ), axiom 2 and the existence of two acts f, g such that f i g for all i ∈ N imply that there exist non-negative numbers λ 1 (f ), · · · , λ n (f ), not all equal to zero, and a real number µ(f ) such that, for all g ∈ K f ,
Now, consider f 1 and f 2 in B(∩ i∈N R i ). Since ∩ i∈N R i ⊆ K f 1 ∩ K f 2 , for all act h ∈ ∩ i∈N R i , we have:
This implies that for all h ∈ ∩ i∈N R i ,
Since by lemma 1, the V i are affinely independent on ∩ i∈N R i , λ i (f 1 ) = λ i (f 2 ) i ∈ N and µ(f 1 ) = µ(f 2 ). Therefore, there exist n non-negative numbers, not all equal to zero, (λ 1 , · · · , λ n ) and a number µ, such that for all f ∈ B(∩ i∈N R i , E),
Finally, it remains to show that the weights (λ 1 , · · · , λ n ) and µ are unique. Since the { i } i∈N satisfy the independent prospects property, there exist for all i ∈ N h i , h i in ∩ i∈N R i such that
We have V 0 (h i ) − V 0 (h i ) = λ i (V i (h i ) − V i (h i )) and thus λ i is unique. This is true for all i ∈ N . But since (λ 1 , · · · , λ n ) are unique, so is µ. Lemma 4 Let (V i ) i∈N be a collection of R i -affine representation of i for all i ∈ N and assume conditions 1, 2, 3 of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Let the weights (λ 1 , · · · , λ n ) ∈ R n + \ {0}, µ ∈ R, be such that
If there exist i, j ∈ N such that λ i , λ j > 0, then these two agents have uncertainty neutral preferences on E.
Proof. First, remark that for any i ∈ N such that λ i > 0, k E i = k E 0 . Indeed, since the { i } i∈N satisfy the independent prospects property, there exist h , h in ∩ i∈N R i such that
We have that
and thus k E 0 = k E i . Suppose now that there exist i, j ∈ N such that λ i , λ j > 0. Consider h i , h i , h j , h j in ∩ i∈N R i such that
and h j j h j h j ∼ h h j , ∀h ∈ N \ {j}.
Note that for α =
Thus,
but it must also be the case that
C2. Proof of Proposition 4
Follows from lemma 1 to 3.
